FLORIDA’S NEWEST DCA IDENTIFIES & CORRECTS LONGSTANDING LEGAL ERROR REGARDING PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING ATTORNEY FEES

The Sixth DCA rendered a surprising opinion last month in Ruffenach where the Court concluded, contrary to sixty years of Florida jurisprudence, that a trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing or rely on expert testimony to award attorneys’ fees. Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2186 (Fla. 6th DCA March 20, 2026). i The Sixth DCA determined that a contrary statement made by the Florida Supreme Court in Crittenden constituted unbinding dicta which did not prevent the Sixth DCA from making a contrary finding. ii

Ruffenach involved the appeal of a final judgment entered in favor of Deutsche Bank wherein the trial court awarded Deutsche Bank attorneys’ fees.iii On review of that judgment, Ruffenach argued the fee award was improper for three reasons: (1) the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees; (2) the trial court failed to receive expert testimony to support the fee award; and (3) Deutsche Bank failed to submit records detailing the work performed by Deutsche Bank’s attorneys.

While affirming the judgment in all other respects, the Sixth DCA found merit in Ruffenach’s third argument and ordered the trial court to enter an amended judgment which did not include an award of attorneys’ fees to Deutsche Bank because the fee award was not supported by detailed billing records.iv However, the Court explicitly rejected Ruffenach’s first two arguments finding that neither an evidentiary hearing nor expert testimony was required to award fees.

The Court explained that there was no “strong logic or policy grounds for imposing [those requirements]” and no statute, rule, or contractual provision required them.v This finding directly conflicted with multiple holdings from each of the other five district courts of appeal. vi For that reason, the Sixth DCA certified the conflict to the Florida Supreme Court and wrote a lengthy opinion explaining the reasoning behind its conflicting decision. vii

Firstly, the Court explained that the dual requirement for an evidentiary hearing and expert testimony to support a fee award was not based in rule or statute, but rather judicially created in 1964 by the Second DCA’s holding Lyle.viii In Lyle, without citing any legal authority, the Second DCA concluded that because of the self-serving nature of testimony given by the attorney seeking the fee award “the value of personal services [had to be] proven by expert witnesses.”ix Thereafter, each of the other district courts of appeal relied on Lyle and adopted the expert testimony requirement and, “without sufficient scrutiny as to its validity,” the requirement “became universal throughout Florida.” x

Although the Sixth DCA could not determine the origin of the dual requirement that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing, the Courtreasoned that the need for an evidentiary hearing “flow[ed] naturally” from the requirement to take expert testimony. xi The Court also noted that in recent times several appellate courts “have repeatedly questioned the legal basis and wisdom” of requiring expert testimony and an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees.xii Elaborating on this point, the Court explained that the trial judge, having firsthand knowledge and involvement in the case (and hundreds of other cases), is more suited to determine the appropriateness of a fee award especially given the fact that a fee expert “is usually little more than a friend of the lawyer seeking fees. xiii

Noting that federal courts have reached the same conclusion, the Court held a party need not call an expert witness to obtain a fee award because “trial judges themselves are experts on attorneys’ fees” and independently “competent to determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.” xiv The Court explained that even though expert testimony was no longer required, a party was still required to demonstrate the attorneys’ fees they sought were reasonable.xv The Court also clarified that there may be times when expert testimony would be required to support a fee award, but that it was no longer “always required.” xvi

Lastly, the Court noted correction of this erroneous precedent affecting attorneys’ fees was “long overdue” and, in a concurring opinion by Judge Mize, the Court invited those practicing and litigating in the Sixth DCA to “vigilantly watch for issues on which our sister courts have erred” so the law can be corrected and improved.xvii We anticipate this unexpected invitation and acknowledgment of erroneous precedent will help Florida courts and its jurisprudence evolve into a more efficient and just system.

In a hurry? Click here for the key points.

1. In a surprising opinion published by the Sixth DCA last month the Court concluded, contrary to sixty years of Florida jurisprudence, that a trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing or rely on expert testimony to award attorneys’ fees. Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 2186 (Fla. 6th DCA March 20, 2026). Notwithstanding this finding, the Court still reversed the judgment entered in favor of Deutsche Bank because the bank failed to submit records detailing the work performed by its attorneys.

2. The Sixth DCA explained that the dual requirement that the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing and take expert testimony before awarding fees was not based on “strong logic,” policy grounds, or existing rules or statutes, but rather judicially created by a case published by the Second DCA in 1964 and followed by the other four district courts of appeal “without sufficient scrutiny as to its validity.” The Sixth DCA certified the conflict between the districts to the Florida Supreme Court.

3. Lastly, the Court noted correction of this erroneous precedent was “long overdue” and, in a concurring opinion by Judge Mize, the Court invited those practicing and litigating in the Sixth DCA to “vigilantly watch for issues on which our sister courts have erred” so the law can be corrected and improved. We anticipate this unexpected invitation and acknowledgment of erroneous precedent will help Florida courts and its jurisprudence evolve into a more efficient and just system.

i Ruffenach, at *1-3.

ii Ruffenach, at 10-12 (citing Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1987)).

iii Ruffenach, at *25. Future references are to this citation until indicated otherwise. iv Ruffenach, at *1-2. Future references are to this citation until indicated otherwise. v Ruffenach, at *2-3.

vi Ruffenach, at *2.

vii Ruffenach, at *2-3.

viii Ruffenach, at *1-4 (citing Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (and others)). ix Ruffenach, at *3-4.

x Ruffenach, at *4, *26.

xi Ruffenach, at *4.

xii Ruffenach, at *5, *7.

xiii Ruffenach, at *7-8.

xiv Ruffenach, at *16-17, n5.

xv Ruffenach, at *8, 13-14.

xvi Ruffenach, at *21.

xvii Ruffenach, at *26, *32.

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